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RECENT CASE NOTES
BmLs AND NOTES-NEG TABILITY-AccELERATING TIME OF PAYMENT-
Plaintiff as indorsee brought suit against defendant as endorser without
first suing the maker of the note or joining the maker in the suit on the
following promissory note: "Ninety days after date I promise to pay to
the order of Guio & Mumma, one hundred and twenty-five and no/10G dol-
lars, negotiable and payable at First National Bank, Brownstown, Indiana,
with interest at rate of 8% per annum and attorneys fees. For value re-
ceived without any relief from valuation and appraisement laws. The
drawers and indorsers severally waive presentment, protest and non-pay-
ment of this note. The express condition of the sale of one No. 4 Rossen-
thal corn husker and one Pratt tractor for which this note is given is such
that title and ownership of the above described property does not pass from
said Guio and Mumma until this note with interest is paid in full. Guio
and Muomma has full power to declare this note due, and take possession of
said property at any time they may deem this note insecure, even before
the maturity of the same." Defendant contended that the clause in the
note, italicized above, made the note non-negotiable and the evidence
showed that plaintiff did not first exercise due diligence against the maker.
Held, note non-negotiable, and being non-negotiable, due diligence must
first be used against the maker before suing an indorser. The court said,
"The clause objected to in this suit gave the payees the power to declare
the note payable at any time they deemed themselves insecure. The matur-
ity of the note depended only upon the determination by the payees that
they were insecure. When that would happen no one could ascertain by
an examination of the note."1
Burns 11360, 1926, provides: "An instrument to be negotiable must
conform to the following requirements: * * * 3. Must be payable on
demand or at a fixed or determinable future time." Burns Sec. 11363,
1926, provides: "An instrument is payable at a determinable future time
within the meaning of this (negotiable instruments) act which is ex-
pressed to be payable, 1. At a fixed period after date or sight; or 2. On
or before a fed or determinable future time specified therein; or 3. On
or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event which is cer-
tain to happen." The principal case is one of first impression in this state
and clearly the weight of authority is with it as is pointed out in the
opinion.2 But upon a clear, logical interpretation of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act, and from analogy of other accelerating events and their rela-
tion to the instrument and the holder or maker, it is submitted that the
decision should be the other way-viz., that where the note is payable
upon a day certain with the added clause that the holder has an option to
SGuio v. Lutes, Appellate Court of Ind., Feb. 16, 1933, 184 N. E. 416.
2 Beynolds v. Vint, 73 Ore. 528, 144 Pac. 526; Great Falls mat. Bankv . Young,
67 Mont. 328, 215 Pac. 651 (1923) ; Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving
Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917); Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan.
71, 116 Pac. 239, 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 390, Anno. Cas. 1912D 1; Peoples Bank v.
Porter, 58 Cal. App. 41, 208 Pac. 200 (1922) ; First State Bank of Cheyenne v. Bar-
ton, 129 Okla. 67, 236 Pac. 142; Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S. W.
21, 44 A. L. Rt. 139 (1925).
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declare the note due at any time he deems himself insecure, the same
should be negotiable.
It has been pointed out that there are four general types of accelera-
tion in commercial paper, all bearing a relationship between the accelerat-
ing event and the holder or maker.3
1. Where the acceleration is wholly within the control of the maker.
2. Where the acceleration is within the control of the maker plus the
power on the part of the holder to exercise an option and declare the
instrument due.
3. Where the accelerating event is in the control of neither the maker nor
the holder.
4. Where the acceleration is wholly within the control of the holder.
Of these four classes the courts are almost uniform in upholding the
negotiability of paper conforming to classes one, two, and three, and are
practically unanimous in declaring paper coming under class four non-
negotiable.
Class 1. It has been held that a note payable "Within one year after
date" was negotiable.4 The statute itself provides a note payable "on or
before" a certain date is negotiable.3 Here the power to accelerate is
wholly within the control of the maker, though for negotiation purposes
such a note is regarded as payable on the date named in the instrument
and only gives the maker an option to accelerate the time of payment.6
If the maker chooses to exercise his option and payment is accepted the
note is paid, unless it is left in circulation and comes in the hands of a
bona fide holder before the named date of payment, in which case the
maker will have to pay a second time,7 being in the same position as one
who has paid a demand note and left it in circulation.8
Class 2. In those cases in which the acceleration is due to the act or
failure to act on the part of the maker plus an exercise of an option on
the part of the holder, the courts have upheld the negotiability. Probably
the most typical of this class is one in which the maker has power to de-
clare the whole of an installment note due upon default of any one install-
ment.9 The exercise of such an option is wholly within the control of the
holder and he may waive it or "exercise by demand, suit, foreclosure, and
similar acts."' 0 Provisions in noninstallment notes that if the semi-annual
interest is not paid the whole principal and interest becomes due at the
option of the holder does not affect negotiability."
3 Ralph TV. A gler in 22 Mich. Law Rev. 710.
'Leader v. Plante, 95 me. 339, 85 Am. St. Rep. 415, 50 AUt. 54; Lowell Trust
Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 67 X. E. 363.
5 Burns' Anno. Stat. 11363, 1926, subs. 2.
6Mattison v. Marks, 31 MIch. 421 (1885).
7 Fogg v. School District of Sedalia, 75 Mo. App. 159 (1898).
8 State v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 15 Cal. 336 (1880).
9Dorbecker v. Brandt C. Downey Co., 88 Ind. App. 557, 163 N. E. 535; Schmidt
'v. Pegg, 172 Mch. 159, 137 N. W. 524; Ashland Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Kerman, 23
Ohio App. 127, 155 N. E. 245; LaDue v. Budd, 51 S. D. 507, 215 N. W. 490.
1C Chaffee "Acceleration in Time Paper," 32 Har. L. Rev. 766.
uArnett v. Clark, 22 Ariz. 409, 198 Pac. 127. See also Utah St. mat. Bank v.
Smith, 18 Colo. 1, 179 Pac. 160; Winn v. La Hart, 155 Minn. 307, 193 N. W. 587,
where a note secured by a mortgage was accelerable on default of mortgage terms.
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Class S. A note payable in one year or "if crop * * * is below
eight bushels per acre this note shall be extended one year" was held ne-
gotiable.12 A trade acceptance providing in margin "Should maker * * *
suffer a fire loss * * * this trade acceptance at option of holder shall
become due and payable" was held negotiable.1S A note payable in twelve
months or before if made out of the sale of a machine was held negotiable.14
Class 4. It is only the class of commercial paper that provides for accele-
ration where the power to accelerate is wholly within the control of the
holder that is held non-negotiable. Why this should be is hard to see. Cer-
tainly the Statute does not so discriminate. The language is broad, being
"on or before a fixed or determinable future time." In fact such language
would seem to include this type of instrument. Nothing is said that should
permit the maker to accelerate and not also include an acceleration con-
trolled by the holder. To admit the negotiability of the other three types
mentioned in this note and exclude the fourth type seems to be a wholly
illogical construction of the statute. In a demand note the power to declare
the note due is wholly within the control of the holder.
The crux of the situation seems best stated by Prof. Ralph W. Aigler
in 22 Mich. Law Review 710. "If certainty is required, as primarily it is
believed to be, so that the paper may be computed with reasonable business
precision as to its money value and so steps may be taken to hold parties
secondarily liable, there is much more reason for objecting to acceleration
provisions depending on the maker's whim." I. D. P.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGuLATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES-The plain-
tiffs, private contract carriers, brought this suit against several state and
county officials to enjoin the enforcement of a Texas statute which provided
for the regulation of contract carriers by motor vehicle.1 This act gave
the Railroad Commission authority to regulate such carriers,2 and among
other things, gave it the power to fix minimum rates3 and to require a per-
mit,4 the granting of which was to be conditioned upon proof that the
operation of the applicant carrier would not interfere with the efficient
service of authorized common carriers. The plaintiffs contend that "the
result of this statute is to compel them to dedicate their property to the
quasi public use of public transportation before they can operate their
motors over the highways, and thus to take their property for public use
without adequate compensation, and to deprive them of their property
without due process of law." From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs
appeal. Held, affirmed.5
In several cases the Supreme Court has held that rate regulation is
unconstitutional outside of public callings-that is, "businesses affected
'2Zt. Bank7 of Halstedw . Bilstad, 152 Iowa 433, 136 N. W. 204.
'3McCormick, v. Gem State Oil, etc., Co., 38 Ida. 470, 222 Pae. 286, 34 A. L. 1-.
867, noted by Aigler in 22 Mich. L. Rev. 710.
"Ernst v. Steccman, 74 Pa. St. 13 (1873).
'Acts Tex., 1931, c. 277; Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Tax., Art. 911(b).
2 See. 4.
3 Sec. 4 and See. 6 (aa).
' Sec. 6 (a).
Stephenson V. Binford, United States Supreme Court, Dec. 5, 1932, 53 & Ct. 181.
